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COMPUTER COOKIE* CONTROL:
TRANSACTION GENERATED INFORMATION
AND PRIVACY REGULATION ON THE
INTERNET
Joshua B. Sessler**
It is important that we tackle these issues now before we
travel down the information superhighway too far and
realize perhaps we've made a wrong turn.'
INTRODUCTION
The ubiquitous use of computers by the government and private
industry to store data pertaining to citizens and patrons has given
rise to increasing concerns about privacy.2 Although governmental
use of such data is regulated, private industry has successfully
resisted application of significant regulation.3 Retail stores, credit
bureaus and telecommunication companies have maintained
virtually unhindered access to information about a customer's usage
. A "computer cookie" is a computer file that collects information about a
computer's activity. Farham Memon, Will Cookies Make the Cut?, INTERACTIVE
WK., Dec. 9, 1996, at 1.
*" Brooklyn Law School Class of 1997. The author would like to thank
Professor Michael Madow for his valuable suggestions during the formulation of
this Note. A special thank you to Phyllis Belkin and Sofie Zoe Belkin-Sessler
who were so understanding and supportive.
' 142 CONG. REc. El 145-01 (daily ed. June 20, 1996) (statement of Rep.
Markey) [hereinafter Markey Statement].
2 See HENRY H. PERRITr, JR., LAW AND THE INFORMATION SUPERHIGHWAY:
PRIVACY, ACCESS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, COMMERCE, LIABILITY § 3.1
(1996) (providing an overview of the privacy issue).
3 Joel R. Reidenberg & Francoise Gamet-Pol, The Fundamental Role of
Privacy and Confidence in the Network, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 105, 113
(1995). See infra Part III.A-B (discussing privacy legislation's effect on
government and the private sector).
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and preferences, sometimes even without the customer's knowl-
edge.4 These entities often sell a consumer's personal information
such as buying habits, credit records and telephone usage,5 to
direct marketing companies.6
Currently, on-line transactions over the Internet and other
networks7 offer analogous information to network service providers
and system administrators.8 In addition to data provided directly by
the user, the electronic transmission itself leaves a "personal
profile"9  sometimes without the user's knowledge." This
"imprint" has been referred to as "transaction generated
' Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy in the Information Economy: A Fortress or
Frontier for Individual Rights, 44 FED. COMM. L.J. 195, 202-03 (1992).
5 Id. at 205-06.
6 PRISCILLA M. REGAN, LEGISLATING PRIVACY: TECHNOLOGY, SOCIAL
VALUES, AND PUBLIC POLICY 228 (1995).
7 The Internet is part of the global network of computers linked via
telephone lines. See CHRISTOPHER CRUMLISH, THE INTERNET DICTIONARY 97
(1995). The World Wide Web ("Web") is a segment of this same network where
special computer languages can be used to create "Web pages" of text and
graphics that can be linked to other pages on the Web. Id. at 214 (describing a
Web page as a "document on the World Wide Web, usually containing ... links
to other documents on the Web"). A "home page" is a starting page on the Web
"with links to other related pages." Id. at 89-90. These can be thought of as an
entryway or table of contents to an individual's or an organization's "Web-
site"-a collection of pages. Each site is really a collection of computer files
available for viewing, downloading (taking a copy) or interacting (sending
comments or questions, or purchasing items). Home pages are "visited" by
network users who either type the page's Web address or Uniform Resource
Locator ("URL") into their Internet navigation program ("browser") or ask any
of several powerful search engines (Lycos, Excite, Alta Vista) to search the
entire Web for sites that contain a specific topic.
8 Internet Service Providers ("ISP") are companies that provide access to the
Internet such as America OnLine, Compuserve, Microsoft Explorer or any of the
smaller commercial, educational or private services. Id. at 178. System
administrators are individuals who run the private, institutional, governmental or
corporate Web-sites visited by computer users who have access to the Web. Id.
at 189.
9A "Personal profile" is an electronic "footprint" analogous to the informa-
tion a telephone call conveys to the telephone company about the length of a
call, its origin and destination but contains nothing about the content of the call.
'0 Jim Erickson, Are Those Who Go Online to Send Junk Mail Out of Line?,
STAR TRIB., June 30, 1996, at 3D.
628
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information" ("TGI")." Such user data can be of value to
advertisers and direct marketing services. 12 Although the U.S.
government also has access to personal information, legislation
based on constitutional rights limits the official use of such data
unless good cause is shown.' 3 Proposed legislation now seeks to
establish guidelines for the private sector's use of personal
data-both voluntarily provided and transmission generated--on the
Internet and other networks.'4
This Note examines the issues surrounding the current and
possible future uses of transaction generated on-line information
and argues for both increased government restrictions and a
broadening of the basis for privacy law in order to protect personal
privacy within the scope of the U.S. Constitution. Part I explores
the capabilities and ramifications of personal electronic data
collection in the 1990s. Part II discusses available equitable
arrangements and technological interventions designed to control
the gathering and use of such data. Part III analyses proposed
legislation, current legislation, regulation and case law impacting on
" See ANNE W. BRANSCOMB, WHO OWNS INFORMATION: FROM PRIVACY
TO PUBLIC ACCESS 48 (1994); Karen Kaplan, Caller ID Service Sparks Battle
Over Privacy, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 25, 1996, at A22; see also Notice of Inquiry:
Privacy Issues Relating to Private Sector Use of Telecommunications-Related
Personal Information, 59 Fed. Reg. 6842, 6845 (Nat'l. Telecommunications &
Info. Admin. Dept. of Commerce, Feb. 11, 1994) [hereinafter Telecom-
munications Privacy Notice] (using the term "Telephone Transmission Generated
Information"); Susan Freiwald, Uncertain Privacy: Communication Attributes
After the Digital Telephony Act, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 949, 953-54 (1996) (using
the term "communication attributes"); Reidenberg & Gamet-Pol, supra note 3,
at 112 (using the phrase "information about information").
2 Robert Hawkins, Junk E-Mail Problem Growing But Solutions May Be on
Way, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Aug. 13, 1996, at 3; John Schwartz, Trail of
Crumbs Leads Right to the Cyber-Cookie Jar, WASH. POST, June 24, 1996, at
F19.
"3 See, e.g., Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act of 1994,
Pub. L. No. 103-414, 108 Stat. 4279 (codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010)
(1994) [hereinafter Digital Telephony Act] (requiring court order before allowing
government to intercept calls or access call-identifying information).
4 Consumer Internet Privacy Protection Act, H.R. 98, 105th Cong., 1 st Sess.
(1997); Communications Privacy and Consumer Empowerment Act of 1996,
H.R. 3685, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1996).
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personal information privacy. Finally Part IV examines the
application of tort and property law principles to the non-con-
sensual use of on-line personal information. This Note concludes
that proposed privacy protection legislation should be passed
immediately and that an expanded legal doctrine based on tort or
property concepts or both is necessary to bolster constitutional
rights against the challenge of unauthorized use of on-line TGI.
I. PERSONAL INFORMATION AND MARKETING IN A DIGITAL
ENVIRONMENT
Nearly all commercial companies (as well as non-profit entities)
are involved in "collecting and maintaining information records" on
customers, employees, members and contributors. These companies
hope to use that information to the company's benefit.' 5 Personal
information about potential customers is sought by marketers to
develop detailed target profiles even when such information is only
transactional-names, addresses and product or service used. 6 The
methods used to gather such information can be either active or
passive. Active gathering is done through manufacturer's registra-
tion or warranty cards, telephone surveys or World Wide Web
("Web")-site entrance registration. 7 Information is also obtained
passively, without any consumer action, via telephone, video rental
or cable records, credit profiles, and, most recently, on-line TGI. s
In this section, several types of passive and transactionally acquired
'5 Mary G. Jones, Privacy: A Significant Marketing Issue for the 1990s, 10
J. PUB. POL'Y & MARKETING 133, 133 (1991).
16 Id. at 134. "The new information technologies have transformed American
marketers into voracious users of personal data." Id. See Ellen R. Foxman &
Paula Kilcoyne, Information Technology, Marketing Practice, and Consumer
Privacy: Ethical Issues, 12 J. PUB. POL'Y & MARKETING 106, 108-11 (1993)
(exploring the ethical dilemmas faced by marketers as they use TGI without a
consumer's knowledge).
"7 See, e.g., The New York Times, The New York Times on the Web (visited
Oct. 11, 1996) <http:\\www.nytimes.com\>(requesting personal information such
as age, gender, zip code and e-mail address before allowing registration for the
New York Times' free on-line service).
"S See generally Freiwald, supra note 11, at 954-57.
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information are described and the pros and cons of their use in
marketing are considered.
A. Transaction Generated Information
TGI is distinguished from content-related computer information.
While content-related information includes the text, data and
electronic mail ("e-mail") address sent via telecommunications
channels (telephone lines via modem, cellular or satellite access), 9
TGI is transmission-related because it is merely a summary of the
electronic transmission itself.20 This information is retrievable and
can be sold to marketing companies 21 who assert that they will be
better able to target a particular consumer's preferences or
22interests.2 This Note considers several types of TGI including
"9 See Freiwald, supra note 11, at 956-58.
20 See Kaplan, supra note 11, at A22.
2 See Hawkins, supra note 12, at 3 (suggesting that third parties have been
compiling mailing lists and consumer profiles based on cookies); Mark Van
Name & Bill Catchings, Web Security andthe Cookie Controversy, PC WK., July
29, 1996, at N6 (positing that addresses could be sold to vendors). See also Barry
Cooper, Concern Over Privacy Is Growing on Internet, ORLANDO SENT., Aug.
31, 1996, at E l (explaining that "profiles" can be packaged with phone directory
and local court information and sold to advertisers and merchandisers).
22 See Erickson, supra note 10, at 3D (using the term "clickstream data" for
this type of information and calling the electronic tracking and compiling of
consumer tendencies "shoppergraphics"). "Advertisers and site operators insist
there is nothing insidious in their motives.. . . One of the perceived advantages
of the Internet over traditional broadcasting and print mass media is that informa-
tion, including advertising can be customized for every individual." Erickson,
supra note 10, at 3D. "'This is not advertising and information as the average
consumer has ever known it. . . . These are a set of technologies designed to get
to know you intimately, to get to know what makes you think, what makes you
respond, and what makes you buy."' Erickson, supra note 10, at 3D (quoting Jeff
Chester, Director of the Center for Media Education in Washington, D.C.); Whit
Andrews, Sites Dip Into Cookies to Track User Info, WEB WK., June 3, 1996,
at 17 (calling cookies "a device that will deliver to users the benefits of a site's
knowing who they are and what they like"); see also Phillip E. Broadbent,
Measuring "Stat Ware "for Site Evaluation: The Best Statistical Programs Offer
Click-Stream Analysis, Customizable DB Queries, DIRECT MARKETING NEWS,
Aug. 5, 1996, at 24 (stating that the best Web-site statistics are especially
valuable to direct marketing companies because they let them see every move
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"cookie" file information,23 Web server administration informa-
tion,24 intelligent transportation information25  and telephone
transmission information.26
1. Cookies and Related Data
One specific kind of file that has been publicized recently is
Persistent Client-Side HyperText Transfer Protocol ("HTTP") 7
files or "cookie" files.28 "Cookies" are user files that are currently
supported by the Netscape 3.0 browser.29 When a Web-site is
visited, the server can write a file onto the user's computer hard-
drive which characterizes what took place at the site.3° In general,
customers make).
23 See infra Part I.A.1 (discussing cookie files and related kinds of data).
24 See infra Part I.A.2 (discussing Web server administration information).
25 See infra Part I.A.3 (discussing intelligent transportation data technology).
26 See infra Part I.A.4 (discussing telephone transmission information).
27 HyperText Transfer Protocol ("HTTP") is the "language" Web browsers
and Web servers use to communicate. See CRICKET LIU ET AL., MANAGING
INTERNET INFORMATION SYSTEMS 287 (1994).
2 See Al Berg, Cookies Nibble at Your Disk Drive, LAN TIMES, July 8,
1996, at 85 (describing cookies as files that Web-sites create and which contain
information transferred to or from the Web-site); James Hannaham, Microchips
Ahoy! New Advertisers Track Your Crumbs, VILLAGE VOICE, Aug. 20, 1996, at
22 (calling the information cookies impart a "minuscule factoid" about the Web-
site visitor); Hawkins, supra note 12, at 3 (defining a cookie as a small file that
contains a profile of a user and his or her computer); Stephan Somogyi, Web-
Based Advertising Is the Same as for Other Media, Only Different, DIGITAL
MEDIA, May 31, 1996, at 11 (stating that cookies provide the capability for
individuals to be remembered between viewings of a Web-site); Van Name &
Catchings, supra note 21, at N6 (pointing out that only the Web-site that placed
the cookie is supposed to be able to retrieve it from the viewer).
2 Netscape Communications Corporation is a producer of software programs
including browser programs, such as Netscape Navigator, that display informa-
tion obtained from the Internet.
30 Cookies can be used in combination with other information available to
the Web server such as "user authentication" to track particular users as they
navigate the Web. See Eamonn Sullivan, Are Web-Based Cookies a Treat or a
Recipe for Trouble?, PC WK., June 24, 1996, at 91 (providing a description of
the relationship between "targeted marketing" companies that place cookies and
the advertisers).
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cookies allow sites to "tag" their visitors with unique identifiers so
they can be identified each time they visit.31 One commentator
equated cookies to the notion of "a store being able to tatoo a bar
code on your forehead, and then laser-scan you every time you
come through the doors. '32 Although the processing of this data
is currently fairly unsophisticated,33 the information can be used
in conjunction with other files to show what computer you are
using, its unique Internet address, the duration of the contact with
a Web-site, what specific pages of a site were visited and what
electronic transactions were made.34 Such transactions include
A "cookie" is a "calling card that reveals where you're coming from, what
kind of computer you have, and many other details. Most sites keep logs of all
visitors." Center for Democracy and Technology, CDT Privacy Demonstration
Page (visited Sept. 13, 1996) <http://www.13x.com/cgi-bin/cdt/snoop.pl>
[hereinafter CDT Privacy Page] (on file with Journal of Law and Policy). The
CDT Privacy Page provides the following readout each time the page is visited:
Hi! This is [wihat we know about you:
Your computer is a running
Your Internet browser is
You are coming from
I see you found this page using the search engine (and I
know what you were searching for, too!).
Id.
3' Andrews, supra note 22, at 17. See Hannaham, supra note 28, at 22
(likening the process to tagging caribou).
32 John Hilvert, Bitter Cookies with Java: Just How Anonymous Is Your
Surfing? (visited Sept. 13, 1996) <http://www.pcuser.com.au/privacy.html> (on
file with Journal of Law and Policy) (quoting Journalist Simson Garfinkel).
"'Stores can also read each other's bar codes if they happen to be in the same
mall ...."' Id.
13 Erickson, supra note 10, at 3D.
" See Public Workshop on Consumer Privacy on the Global Information
Infrastructure, ch. II (July 1996) (visited Feb. 10 1997) <http://www.ftc.gov/-
www/bcp/conline/pubs/privacy> (on file with Journal of Law and Policy)
[hereinafter FTC PRIVACY REPORT] (citing that a Web-site "can 'know' users'
e-mail addresses, the names of their browsers, the type of computer they are
using and the URL or Internet address, of the site from which they linked to the
current site"). See also Hilvert, supra note 32, at <http://www.pcuser.com.-
au/privacy.html> (stating that during a visit to a Web-site a log can be recorded
which includes a user's Internet Protocol ("IP") address and possibly how long
the user was online and what actions the user took).
633
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purchases or requests for further information.
A program that "reads" cookies may be employed to build a
database of information. 35 Technology will undoubtedly enable
marketing companies to target a specific user with individual offers
or advertisements tailored to his or her unique past interests and
behavior.36 The user may not be aware that the gathering of this
information is taking place, although there is a proposal to require
Web-sites to carry a logo which states that information is being
tracked or made available to third parties.37 Other types of user
data gatherers include: the Oil Change program which produces a
tailor-made list of items found on various hard drives;38 Click
Stream Data which compiles a list of what items on a Web page
have been clicked on;39 and DoubleClick which receives informa-
tion from cookie-like files and is thereby able to send unique
advertisements to an advertisement window each time a page is
visited by the same person.4" Thus, cookies and related technol-
ogies are able to "harvest" information about a subject without any
action or approval on the subject's part. In addition to enacting
legislation that prevents these secondary uses of personal informa-
tion, our country must also acknowledge and codify some sort of
right to ownership and control of the information in order to
fundamentally protect it.
3' Hawkins, supra note 12, at 3; Van Name & Catchings, supra note 21, at
N6; CDT Privacy Page, supra note 30. Computer logs can be used for marketing
purposes by tying together on-line profiles of users with other publicly available
information to develop "rich market data." Freiwald, supra note 11, at 958. See
Broadbent, supra note 22, at 24 (explaining new technology that records each
user's unique IP address in a database and which is a "far more advanced way[]
of tracking this information" than using cookie files).
36 See Hawkins, supra note 12, at 3.
37 eTRUST (project sponsored by Electronic Freedom Foundation). See infra
Part II.C, note 111 and accompanying text (discussing eTRUST and other non-
governmental methods of addressing usage of personal information).
3' Todd Copilevitz, Oil Change Renews On-Line Privacy Fears,
GREENSBORO NEWS & REC., Aug. 12, 1996, at D2.
" Erickson, supra note 10, at 3D.
40 Ed Foster, Can Mixing Cookies with Online Marketing Be a Recipe for
Heartburn?, INFOWORLD, July 22, 1996, at 54. "'All we're using it for is to keep
track of which ads we've shown you so you don't keep seeing the same one.'
Id. (quoting CEO and President of DoubleClick Kevin O'Connor).
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2. Server Administration Data
Each server has a system administrator who can monitor the
TGI of all users who visit the site.4' Usually such capability is
designed to enhance monitoring of system efficiency or security.
42
Site administrators or "Web Masters" can have access to logs of
server usage and user information including length of time logged
on, particular pages visited or downloaded, type of browser used
and the user's IP address. 43 Although many administrators pledge
privacy to their subscribers, some could be lured by financial
compensation offers from marketers. 4 At the very least, legis-
lation is needed immediately to limit the potential unauthorized
uses of such information. However if an individual right in personal
information was recognized in general, misuse of such information
would be minimized.
3. Intelligent Transportation Data Technology
Intelligent Transportation Data Technology that picks up
transmissions from vehicles or remote sites on roadways is being
increasingly used to track whole fleets or individual vehicles.45
This technology provides information concerning security,
41 Interview with Richard Jagric, System Manager, Brooklyn Law School,
in Brooklyn, N.Y. (Sept. 12, 1996).
42 Id. See Freiwald, supra note 11, at 958 (stating that electronic service
providers maintain information on their customers' usage and that such logs can
be used "in the event that a visitor to a system harms it").
41 Interview with Richard Jagric, supra note 41. See LIU ET AL., supra note
27, at 316-17. There are several tools available to help the administrator analyze
activity. These include "getstats," "wwwstat," "wusage" and use information
from "httpd logs" that include: the host name, the date and time and the
URL-Web-site address-request. Id.
4' Bill Mann, Stopping You Watching Me, INTERNET WORLD, Apr. 1997, at
44 (discussing the possibility of such a sale).
45 See Dorothy J. Glancy, Privacyandlntelligent Transportation Technology,
11 COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 151, 153 (1995) (discussing the use of such
technology to track the weight, speed, tailpipe emissions, worn tires, brakes and
even specific driving patterns of vehicles).
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maintenance, road conditions and whereabouts.46 It is also cur-
rently used in toll booths to deduct payment from an account
without the vehicle having to stop.47 Although this is a voluntary
system, information about a traveler's location can be used to
pierce an alibi or establish a pattern of travel without the direct
knowledge of the traveler.48
The information that would be generated in an [Intelligent
Transportation System ("ITS")] environment would be of
interest primarily to law enforcement authorities and
commercial marketers[] . . . who are interested in develop-
ing profiles of individual habits, patterns, and life-styles
[and] regard information resulting from the ITS as a key
component of an individual profile that has not been easily
documented before.49
Without the guidance and limitations of legislation and a grounding
of privacy principles in individual rights, secondary uses that
encroach on personal privacy will inevitably be made of this
technology, as well.
46 See Sally Katzen, Statement Before the House Banking and Financial
Services Subcomm. on Domestic and International Monitoring Policy, FED.
NEWS SERV., Oct. 11, 1995, § II(C)(4), available in LEXIS, News Library,
Fednew File (reporting on the findings of various public forums gathering
information on the government's role in protecting the "National Information
Infrastructure" and explaining the uses and potential misuses of this technology).
"Such systems may also help monitor traffic patterns and road conditions through
cameras or other sensors, and provide drivers with information in their cars about
the quickest route." Id.
" Id For example, in New York State the E-Z Pass system is used to auto-
matically deduct tolls from drivers' credit cards.
48 See, e.g., Phil Agre, Highway Tolls and Privacy, 5 PRIVACY FORUM DIG.
3, 2 (June 1, 1996) <http://www.vortex.com/privacy.html> (citing a story from
Agence France Presse on August 17, 1993, reporting a northern French town
mayor's alibi being punctured by the lack of evidence that his car passed through
a toll). See also Glancy, supra note 45, at 153-54 (discussing how such
information can be used by third parties such as law enforcement agents, private
investigators, advertisers and stalkers).
49 REGAN, supra note 6, at 142.
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4. Automatic Number Identification
Originally used by telephone companies to identify a caller for
billing purposes when transferring a call to another network, caller
identification ("Caller ID")5 ° was later offered as a service to
customers and became controversial." Despite the current regu-
lations on Caller ID services,5" the Federal Communications
Commission ("FCC") allows companies who are called on an "800"
or "900" number to add the caller's number to their database of
customers without informing the caller. 3 This identifier can also
be used to get further information on the caller such as address,
income level and recent purchases that can then be sold to
telemarketers.5 4 Again it is apparent that such personal informa-
tion is susceptible to unauthorized uses without the proscriptions of
legislative and judicial doctrines.
B. Direct Marketing
Currently, there is a conflict raging about the ultimate value of
direct marketing. There is little doubt that marketing has a positive
effect on the sales of products, especially when campaigns are
'0 "Caller ID" is defined as automated number identification in which the
calling number is displayed. BRANSCOMB, supra note 11, at 43.
" The central issue in the controversy is whose privacy should be given the
most protection-the caller or the one called. GINi G. SCOT, MIND YOUR OWN
BUSINESS: THE BATrLE FOR PERSONAL PRIVACY 346 (1995). Those making the
calls do not want their privacy violated especially if they are calling a hot line
anonymously versus those who see the identification as a crime deterrent or
investigative tool. Id. See BRANsCOMB, supra note 11, at 44 (citing a Harris poll
which found 55% of respondents for regulation of Caller ID, 25% who wanted
it banned completely and only 13% in favor of no regulation at all).
52 Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 47 U.S.C. § 1002 (a)(2)
(prohibiting call-identifying information from being released to the government
without a court order or other lawful authorization and from containing
information which discloses the physical location of the caller).
53 SCOT, supra note 51, at 346.
54 SCOTT, supra note 51, at 346.
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targeted toward a particular group." Yet surveys show that
Americans mistrust marketing companies and feel that information
in the marketers' hands is not secure.56 As more and more people
use the Internet and other networks for commercial activities, direct
marketing is being used on-line. According to the Direct Marketing
Association ("DMA"),5 7 more than half of direct marketers are
using the Internet and the Web for advertising and forty-eight
percent are "mining the membership rosters of major computer
online services for e-mail addresses. 5 8 TGI represents a source of
55 SCOTT, supra note 51, at 318 (noting that targeted contacts increase sales
by 5-10% while non-targeted marketing only increase sales by 1-2%).
56 See JOHN M. CARROLL, CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION SOURCES: PUBLIC
AND PRIVATE 51 (2d ed. 1991) (citing a 1990 poll commissioned by Equifax,
carried out by Louis Harris and Associates and audited by Alan Weston, noted
privacy expert and Columbia Law School professor, that found that of nine
institutions--including employers, telephone companies and credit bureaus--direct
marketing firms engendered the least amount of trust). A 1994 Harris survey of
American's attitudes about privacy and emerging interactive technologies which
found that:
82% of the respondents stated that they are concerned about threats to
their personal privacy; 78% believe that consumers have lost all control
over how businesses circulate and use personal information; 76%
believe that businesses ask consumers for too much personal informa-
tion and 70% have refused to give information to a business because
they felt it was either unnecessary or too personal.
FTC PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 34, at ch. II.B. Another statistic from the
survey which is particularly relevant to this discussion is that "51% of the
respondents stated they would be concerned if an interactive service to which
they subscribed engaged in 'subscriber profiling,' i.e., the creation of individual
profiles based upon subscribers' usage and purchasing patterns, in order to
advertise to subscribers." FTC PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 34, at ch. II.B.
" "The Direct Marketing Association ("DMA") is the largest trade
association for businesses interested in database marketing with more than 3600
member companies from the United States and 47 foreign nations." The Direct
Marketing Association, The Direct Marketing Association-Reception (visited
Feb. 10, 1997) <http://www.the-dma.org/lobbypages/lobby-reception.html>(on
file with Journal of Law and Policy).
5" Erickson, supra note 10, at 3D. Recently, the program for the afternoon
session of an "Internet Marketing Seminar" offered at the Montague Institute
listed the following session: "Extending Traditional Programs: Cookies and
Bulletins, Java and Its Implications, Database Searches and Privacy and Security
Issues." Brochure, The Montague Institute, Internet Marketing Seminar:
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valuable, accurate and inexpensive information that, when made
available to marketers, can be a useful and powerful tool. Those
who value the marketers' distilling and targeting services are
enthusiastic about the possibilities. Those who mistrust marketers
are doubly concerned because of the all-encompassing nature of the
on-line uses. Ultimately, however, society must choose the nature
and the extent of personal information use. Our legal system
requires that this standard be articulated through legislative and
judicial processes.
1. In Defense of the Use of Transaction Generated Information
In what is characterized as a win-win situation, the direct
marketing community claims that consumers want to receive
material that is of interest to them and do not want to sift through
piles of "junk."59 The marketers claim that TGI is an effortless
way to track consumer preferences and provide additional
60options. With so much data to choose from on the Internet,
cookies are seen as a personalized screening mechanism.
61
Cookies also enable the user to enter a password once and have it
Afternoon Session (visited Sept. 13, 1996) <http://www.montague.com> (on file
with Journal of Law and Policy).
" Erickson, supra note 10, at 3D. "The holy grail of one-to-one marketing
is individual information." Erickson, supra note 10, at 3D (citing Kathleen
Burke, Director of Marketing and Communications for Internet Profiles Corp.,
a San Francisco-based company that provides services and software for inde-
pendent analysis of Web-site usage).
60 Erickson, supra note 10, at 3D (citing various marketing companies
including, Texas Internet, Internet Profiles Corporation, Juno Online Services
L.P. and Fine.com Interactive as well as the DMA. "'People like being called by
name, they like having information sorted for them[.] ... We're not talking
about invasion of privacy, we're trying to give people only what they need."'
Erickson, supra note 10, at 3D (quoting Dan Fine, Chief Executive of Fine.com
Interactive).
6 Robert Gellman, They Could Be Watching Your Every Web Move, GOV'T
COMPUTER NEWS, Apr. 29, 1996, at 25. "It is similar to a waiter in your favorite
restaurant who remembers what you like to eat. The good part is that you get
personal service. The bad part is that someone knows your habits and interests
and can tell others." Id.
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"read" the next time a restricted area is visited.62 In addition,
cookies are a form of the technology that exists behind the
"shopping basket" feature of some Web-sites, which enables items
purchased and "carried" from different pages or links to be totalled
or listed before signing off.63 Other uses of TGI include new
visitor counting,64  behavior tracking,65  self-configuring Web
pages66  and "intelligent" information collectors such as
PointCast.67 There is an increasing need for the gathering and
62 Berg, supra note 28, at 85.
63 See Berg, supra note 28, at 85 (relating the author's experience of using
such a "shopping-cart system" to total up an order at a commercial Web-site);
Hilvert, supra note 32, at 2 (calling such service a "virtual shopping mall");
David Orenstein, Software Eats Unwanted Web "Cookies, " ALB. TIMES UNION,
Sept. 10, 1996, at El (reporting the use of a "shopping basket" system at the
on-line book store, Amazon.com).
64 "New visitor counting" means the page counts not just total number of
"hits" or visits but the number of times each individual returns to the page.
Htmlscript Implements "Caller ID" Feature; Simplifies Cookies and Allows
HTML Web Developers to Easily Track and Identify Individual Web Browsers,
Bus. WIRE, Sept. 3, 1996, at 1, available in LEXIS, News Library, Busdtl File
[hereinafter Htmlscript]. "HTML" stands for hypertext mark-up language which
is the programming language used to create the layout and text on most Web-
sites, as of this writing. CRUMLISH, supra note 7, at 91.
61 See Htmlscript, supra note 64, at 1. "Behavior tracking" is the process
whereby the htmlscript program can track each mouse click while the visitor
explores the Web page, providing data to the Web page owner on how users
navigate the site. Htmlscript, supra note 64, at 1.
66 See Htmlscript, supra note 64, at 1. If a visitor sets Web page configura-
tion preferences (such as background colors and content), they will be
remembered and restored each visit. Htmlscript, supra note 64, at 1.
67 Louise McElvogue, The Web Gains That Personal Touch, GUARDIAN, July
18, 1996, at 2. PointCast is a service on the Web that provides software which
periodically scans the Internet for user specified information and displays updates
on news, sports and other areas of interest when the computer is turned on. Id.
It is able to "learn" other areas of user interest by tracking Internet travels. Id.
Several other products are also able to "narrowcast" or deliver a custom
experience for each viewer. Id. The Wall Street Journal's Personal Journal and
the New York Times' Clipper service capture only the type of news reports
requested by the subscriber. Id. Firefly is another service on the Web that selects
content for its users. It uses "agent technology" to seek out other net users with
similar tastes and "learns" more about the user's preferences depending on how
the user responds to the information. Id. See generally Kevin Kelly & Gary
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sorting of information from the Internet. Without individualized
"screening" mechanisms, one can easily experience information
overload and be less able to use the wealth of knowledge that exists
on-line.
In addition, the American marketing community claims that if
restraints are put on the commercial use of the system, it will not
survive, spelling the loss of the promise of global interconnected-
ness.6" It is because the United States lacks privacy restraints that
it has been able to assume world leadership while the Europeans
have embraced such laws and are not able to compete.69
Finally, an economic argument is made that the ease and
efficiency of marketing in the electronic age will decrease transac-
tion costs which will be beneficial to society.7° For example,
corporations will be able spend more time marketing to those who
truly are interested in their products; interested consumers can
acquire more information and others will not waste time sifting
through unsolicited electronic mail.71
In sum, the defenders of the free use of personal information
see the minimal loss of anonymity as well worth the individual and
societal benefits of easier information access.
2. In Fear of the Uses of Transaction Generated Information
To privacy advocates, however, the release of information
without one's consent represents a serious breach of privacy,
Wolf, Push: Kiss Your Browser Goodbye: The Radical Future of Media Beyond
the Web, WIRED, Mar. 1997, at 12 (describing this new type of technology that
is called "push" technology because it is information that is pushed to the user
rather than what the user finds by actively searching the Internet); Niel
Robertson, A Personalized Web, INTERNET WORLD, Apr. 1997, at 32-34 (discuss-
ing push and agent technology).
68 Robert Posch, A Serious Nation Validates Itself in Serious Challenges:
Privacy, 58 DIRECT MARKETING 46, 48 (Nov. 1995) (arguing that our society has
chosen to give up some privacy in return for the economic freedoms that have
given the United States "a monopoly on the information economy").
69 Id. at 49 (stating "no greater regulatory burden could be imposed on an
information economy than burdensome, pointless privacy regulations").
70 FTC PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 34, at ch. I.
"' FTC PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 34, at ch. I.
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especially when the information concerns where one has traveled
(on-line or "on the road"), how long one has visited and what
transactions took place.72 Without controls, they argue, additional
uses could be made of such information that could conflict with a
person's interests or desires. For example, summaries of on-line
interests could be sold to direct marketers who would then initiate
a direct e-mail or "snail mail" (regular mail) campaign.73 More
significantly, medical status might be inferred from Web interests
and used to disadvantage an individual if provided to a medical
insurer or employer.74 In addition, interests in certain sites could
lead to inferences about a person's religious, political or sexual
preferences that might also be used against them.75 Therefore, the
security of such information is of great concern. In addition, when
personal information is obtained without knowledge or consent not
only is there an affront to individual integrity but it threatens the
use of the system itself. A lack of confidence in the network causes
72 See Steve Ulfelder, Online Snoop!: Editor Turns Electronic Gumshoe,
Digs Up Dirt-On Himself COMPUTERWORLD, Aug. 12, 1996, at 82. See also
PERRIT1, supra note 2, at 147 (arguing that "the possibility that some enterprises
* . . may make money by collecting consumer transaction data and selling the
'click stream' implicates major personal privacy concerns"). See generally CDT
Privacy Page, supra note 30 (providing information on electronic privacy
concerns and links to other privacy Web-sites such as the Electronic Freedom
Foundation and the Electronic Privacy Information Center).
71 CDT Privacy Page, supra note 30 (noting that, although one might not be
concerned if such a campaign resulted in a free sample, coupons, or e-mail
regarding tobacco products, for instance, if visits to tobacco Web-sites resulted
in escalating insurance premiums due to categorization as a smoker there might
be reason to worry).
" Judith B. Prowda, A Lawyer's Ramble Down the Information Super-
Highway: Privacy and Security of Data, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 738, 742 (1995).
"Of all the types of information, collected about individuals, the public is most
troubled by the prospect of unauthorized disclosure of medical... information."
FTC PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 34, at ch. 2.D. (citing the testimony of
Professor Alan Westin). See Jones, supra note 15, at 134 (noting the possibility
that insurance companies and employers can use prescreening and database
matching to identify "individuals whose costs exceed the norm or whose life-
styles are such as to mark them as likely candidates for certain types of
illnesses").
" See Freiwald, supra note 11, at 959 n.37 (describing how searches could
be run on keywords such as "abortion," "communist" or "homosexual").
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a "crisis of confidence" in providers of communication and
communication entrepreneurs themselves.76 Providers understand
that short-term benefits could turn into long-term problems if
consumers discover how information is being used and react
negatively toward a company."7 Although companies may seek
access to consumer information, they do not want their own
corporate information made available on the network.78 Finally,
without an enforceable standard of security and reliability, these
services will lose participants and commerce will be threatened.79
Increasingly, as foreign countries that restrict the use of
personal information refuse to trade with a country whose standards
are insufficient, global commerce will also be jeopardized." For
example, the European Union Privacy Directive states that:
Member States shall provide that the transfer to a third
country of personal data which are undergoing processing
76 Reidenberg & Gamet-Pol, supra note 3, at 122 (for example, if a company
is tracking female wig buying or male fashion underwear purchases).
" Reidenberg & Gamet-Pol, supra note 3, at 122. For example, in January
1991, Lotus and Equifax, a credit bureau, planned to release "Marketplace," a
CD-ROM which revealed detailed information on the shopping habits of 120
million Americans. CARROLL, supra note 56, at 163-64. The program was
withdrawn as a result of protests from the American Civil Liberties Union
("ACLU") and consumer activists. CARROLL, supra note 56, at 164.
" Reidenberg & Gamet-Pol, supra note 3, at 122 (citing the loss in
confidence when the Clinton administration proposed the Clipper Chip standard
of security that took control away from individual corporations).
" Reidenberg & Gamet-Pol, supra note 3, at 122-23.
80 See Reidenberg & Gamet-Pol, supra note 3, at 123 (discussing the lack
of "global interoperability" between the European Communities ("EC") and the
United States); see also Reidenberg, supra note 4, at 240-41 (reviewing EC
privacy policies as well as that of several individual European nations);
Electronic Privacy Information Center, A Review of the Proposed Principles of
the Privacy Working Group (visited Sept. 6, 1996) <http://www.epic.org> (on
file with Journal of Law and Policy) (stating that "the proposed privacy
principles will be considered inadequate by most European countries because the
principles provide insufficient protection for personal data"). See generally COLIN
J. BENNETT, REGULATING PRIVACY: DATA PROTECTION AND PUBLIC POLICY IN
EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES (1992) (comparing the development of privacy
doctrines in Europe and the United States and questioning whether harmonization
will be possible).
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or are intended for processing after transfer may take place
only if ... the third country in question ensures an
adequate level of protection.'
If the third country does not meet this "adequacy" standard the
"Member States shall take the measures necessary to prevent the
transfer of data of the same type to the third country in ques-
tion. Therefore, consumers, businesses and international
communities are arguing for immediate legislative action and
judicial guidelines to protect the use of personal information.
3. Society's Choice
The societal issues raised by such opposing views, although
familiar, are of a wholly new order in the digital age. While some
argue that electronic intrusions into the private sphere are not
harmful in nature, 3 are freely available from other sources84 and,
in fact, may be beneficial,85 the existence of instantly available
and transactionally generated personal information completely
changes the scope of the issue. As the use of cookie files and
related technologies increase, so too will public debate about
8 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24
October 1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of
Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, Eur. O.J. L281/31 (Nov.
23, 1995). The International Electronic Rights Server, Privacy International
(visited Feb. 11, 1997) <http://www.privacy.org/pi/intlorgs/ec/dpdirective-
final.txt> (on file with Journal of Law and Policy).
82 Id. (emphasis added).
83 Robert Brueckner, "Cookies" Will Crumble Without Value; The Real
Opportunity: Cultivating One-on-One Relationships, DIRECT MARKETING NEWS,
Sept. 23, 1996, at 18. Despite the plethora of information obtained from cookie
files, it is largely descriptive of the entire Internet-surfing population and not
specific to any individual. Id.
84 Credit reports and credit cards, for example, give much information about
interests and travel through purchase histories. Reidenberg & Gamet-Pol, supra
note 3, at 121-22 (obtaining records of credit card purchases, magazine
subscriptions and public information, however, are not without time- and
resource-consuming efforts that increase the cost of obtaining such information).
85 See supra Part I.B.1 (discussing the positive aspects of using TGI).
644
INTERNET PRIVACY
whether and to what degree such intrusions should be regulated.16
In resolving this conflict, society must make fundamental decisions
about the privacy principles that will guide technology and
communications into the twenty-first century. It is yet another
opportunity to lay the legal groundwork for a comprehensive
privacy policy-guidance this country has never enjoyed.
II. EXTRA-LEGAL REMEDIES AND CONTROLS
Although current law does not directly regulate the use of
personal information by private industry,87 there are several "extra-
legal" 8 options that can impact on the uses of such information.
These include industry self-regulation, technological "fixes" and a
free market or economic approach.
A. Industry Self-Regulation
Information businesses have a large stake in protecting the
privacy of communication networks generally. This not only
includes maintaining the confidence of their customers but also
protecting the security of their company's information.89
Selfregulation can take the form of explicit codes of company
86 See, e.g., FTC PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 34, ch. I (discussing the
challenges facing consumers, institutions and the government in the area of
privacy and technology).
87 See infra Part III (discussing the legal remedies which address personal
privacy). See also Freiwald, supra note 11, at 950-51 (stating that the disclosure
of "communication attributes"-TGI-is protected more weakly, if at all, than
is the content of communications).
88 The term "extra-legal" means outside the legal-legislative system.
89 Paul M. Alberta, DMers Told They Could Be Driven Out of Business Over
Privacy Issue, DIRECT MARKETING NEWS, Apr. 5, 1993, at 7 (citing a speaker
at the 28th annual spring conference of the Direct Marketing Association stating
"[e]ither we regulate ourselves or we shall be regulated out of business with only
ourselves to blame"). "There is always the possibility of being legislated virtually
out of existence by the Federal Trade Commission. . . . The privacy issue is
going to be very sensitive, and invasion of privacy legislation could virtually
destroy our new information-gatheringtechniques."Self-PolicingNeededTo Stem
Legislative Tide, MARKETING NEWS, Aug. 2, 1985, at 13 (quoting the President
of Speigel, Inc.).
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conduct, actual contracts with consumers or informal norms and
business practices. 90 In addition, influence from outside groups9'
may promote "good citizenship" standards. But problems arise in
this area because most self-regulation programs are not legally
binding and there are few enforcement mechanisms. Even when a
company has a policy, it is not obligated to reveal it to the
public,9 2 and usually will not, unless there is a marketing or
publicity advantage to be gained.
The Direct Marketing Association has established guidelines for
its members that promote consumer control over their own
information. 93 In other contexts, the industry has recommended
that members honor requests from consumers not to reuse informa-
tion.94 However, not all marketers are members of the DMA. 95
A recent trade article suggests that despite the ease of both
obtaining information by way of TGI, and marketing information
via "d-mail" (direct e-mail), restraint should be practiced in order
to prevent the alienation of potential clients.
96
90 For example, both American Express and Chase Manhattan have codes
that prohibit the disclosure of customer records to third parties, and Chase
assumes an obligation to limit internal use of its customers' files to employees
directly involved. Jones, supra note 15, at 31.
"' For example, the ACLU, the Electronic Privacy Information Center, the
Center for Democracy and Technology or the Electronic Freedom Frontier are
among such groups.
92 See Reidenberg & Gamet-Pol, supra note 3, at 120.
" The Direct Marketing Association sponsors both a mail and telephone
"preference service" that will remove a customer's name from a central mailing
list upon request. See SCOTT, supra note 51, at 320.
9 ScOTr, supra note 5 1, at 320.
5 Another group to which many on-line marketers belong is the Interactive
Services Association, a 16-year-old association that promotes and develops
"consumer interactive services" worldwide. Interactive Services Association,
Guidelines for Online Services (visited Feb. 10, 1997) <http://www.isa.net/-
about/whatisa.html>.
96 Brueckner, supra note 83, at 18. Once alienated by and alerted to the
effects of "d-mail" (direct e-mail), customers will start refusing the cookies and
"they'll investigate and invest in 'cookie-cutter' technology. Already, mail-
filtering software has the ability to scuttle even the best d-mail effort. And more
is on the way." Brueckner, supra note 83, at 18. See infra Part III.B (discussing
these technologies).
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On-line service providers also police themselves and, in fact,
many already have privacy clauses in their provider agreements.97
A Web consortium called "W3" has been established as an "official
standards body" with a focus on gathering user demographic
information.98 In addition, I/CODE, a commercial "universal
registration system," bills itself as a solution to "gathering valuable
demographic data on visitors" and provides an incentive-based
program to customers who voluntarily give personal information.99
The program explicitly states that it will "never disclose any
I/CODE member's identity or personal contact information without
the user's explicit authorization. '
Thus, although there is a general acceptance by commercial and
marketing enterprises of the need for self-regulation, lacking
mandates or guidance from government, there is little agreement on
a universal system that can meet the needs of diverse industries, as
well as consumers.
B. Consumer Self-Help Technology
Filling the void in regulation, entrepreneurs have begun to
create products that can block TGI from remote viewers. These
include dedicated software such as Internet Fast Forward,'0 '
NSClean3210 2  and Web Filter.' °3  Netscape has added an
97 Center for Democracy and Technology, Privacy Policy Chart-Online
Service Providers (visited Mar. 19, 1997) <http://www.cdt.org/privacy/-
online services/chart.html>.
9' The World Wide Web Consortium, Proposals for Gathering Consumer
Demographics (visited September 13, 1996) <http://www.w3.org/pub/WWW/-
Demographics/>. See infra Part II.B (discussing the Consortium's program).
9I /PRO, I/CODE: A Universal Registration System (visited Sept. 23, 1996)
<http://www.icode.ipro.icode_ corporate_site//>.
'00 Id. See FTC PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 34, at ch. III.A.1 (describing
/PRO as an example of a universal registration system).
,"' See Berg, supra note 28, at 87 (explaining that Internet Fast Forward will
filter cookies and advertising graphics).
,02 See Orenstein, supra note 63, at El (describing software that gives out
false e-mail addresses as users visit sites).
'03 See Laura Rich, Overriding Web Ads, INSIDE MEDIA, May 15, 1996, at
27 (describing Fast Forward's competitor WebFilter which requires users to
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adjustment to its 3.0 Browser that, when configured correctly,
warns the user that a remote site is placing a cookie file."° The
user can then prevent the cookie from being given. However, it is
important to note that not all users have 3.0 and that the default
setting on the browser is to not warn of the cookie.
Another technique used to protect information is to make the
information useless to commercial concerns. One means of
achieving this status is to use a server that allows anonymous Web
surfing such as The Anonymizer.' °5
The World Wide Web Consortium at the Massachusetts Institute
of Technology developed a Platform for Internet Content Selection
("PICS") to enable parents to block their children's access to
certain Internet sites °6 via a rating system similar to that being
designed for television. However, such a system can also be used
to enhance privacy by way of a rating system based upon the
"privacy-protectiveness" of the Web-site. The desired level of
protection could be set individually, thereby allowing a person who
is not concerned about giving out personal information to visit all
sites, while another might want to restrict Web wanderings to only
those sites that have pledged to not divulge personal information
without permission.' 7 In a similar vein, a third approach to the
lack of privacy regulation is a free market philosophy.
C. Free Market
If no regulation is imposed, either internally or by the govern-
ment, economic forces presumably will act on the information flow
to enable consumers to choose the level of privacy they would
forgo in return for compensation of a sort.' In one experiment
designate pages it wants to be ad-free).
104 Sullivan, supra note 30, at 75.
'o' See The Anonymizer, Anonymous Surfing (visited Sept. 13, 1996)
<http://www.anonymizer.com> (service that allows Internet communication
"without revealing any personal information").
106 FTC PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 34, at ch. III.A.3.
107 FTC PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 34, at ch. III.A.3.
1og But see REGAN, supra note 6, at 228 (arguing that "three factors limit the
effectiveness" of such an approach: 1) the contradictory interests of third party
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in West Covina, California, a shopping mall provided an incentive
to shoppers to provide the mall stores with personal data.1"9
Those that gave information on their income and spending were
eligible for prizes amassed from the sale of the information to
direct marketing companies."' In a sense, these consumers
realized the value of their personal information and knowingly
risked their anonymity in a lottery for a chance to get a greater
return.
In the on-line world, the Electronic Frontier Foundation, a San
Francisco-based Internet watchdog organization, is starting a world-
wide campaign in which participating Web-sites will reveal their
privacy policies via different logos called "trustmarks.' This
program, known as eTRUST, has been developed to inform users
whether personal information is being collected, and if so, whether
it will be released to third parties." 2 In this way, consumers can-
make informed choices about whether they wish to continue
visiting a site where their personal information is not secure.
information holders; 2) the "nonvoluntary nature" of many consumer-information
holder relationships; and 3) technology).
109 SCOTT, supra note 51, at 322. After filling out applications asking for
personal information such as "addresses, the ages of family members, income
level, reading habits and plans to purchase cars or jewelry," participants received
Plaza Players Club cards that, when inserted into automatic teller machines at the
mall, made them eligible for weekly prizes such as $500.00, vacations, gifts and
discount coupons. SCOTT, supra note 51, at 322. Although there was an initial
fear from privacy advocates that the information would be sold to marketers
outside the mall, "the data was kept in the mall, and most consumers found the
program beneficial." SCOTT, supra note 51, at 322. "They were quite willing to
give up the information asked with the understanding that this data about their
buying habits might be sold in return for the possibility of various awards. . .
SCOTT, supra note 51, at 322.
110 ScoTT, supra note 51, at 322.
.. The eTRUST, eTRUST On-Site Information Page (visited Nov. 27, 1996)
<http://www.etrust.org/onsite.html>. eTRUST has three tiers which can be chosen
by program participants: (1) No Exchange--"insures anonymous usage,
anonymous transactions, anonymous chat and anonymous tracking;" (2) One to
one Exchange--ensures "that the services will not disclose individual or
transactional data to third parties;" and (3) Third Party Exchange--"informs the
user that the services will be disclosing information to third parties." Id.
112 See Orenstein, supra note 63, at El.
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These models, however, assume that people are free to contract
voluntarily. In fact, obtaining personal information from a network
without a customer's knowledge is not a voluntary arrangement.
The individual is not technically a party to the exchange. Most
importantly, "it is not in the interests of the third party record
keepers to give people complete information. . . because it would
lower the value of their product if people denied organizations the
ability to use personal information as a commodity."' 13
Whether on not the inequities in such free market arrangements
are resolved, it is clear that consumers and industries are trying to
find ways to address privacy questions in the on-line world. Barring
the effectiveness of self-regulation, technological self help arrange-
ments and free market solutions, it is likely that citizens will turn
to the legal system for ultimate guidance in this volatile area as
they have when other technological threats to privacy have arisen.
III. LEGAL REMEDIES
The United States does not have comprehensive privacy rights
or principles that address "the acquisition, storage, transmission, use
or disclosure of personal information within the business com-
munity.""' 4 As a result, legal protections are enacted through ad
hoc legislation or by individual states' common laws." 5 Although
various statutes protect individuals from the government's misuse
of personal data," 6 there is little legislation of the use of personal
113 REGAN, supra note 6, at 228. Given the opportunity to opt out of
providing information, only about 20% utilized the option. See REGAN, supra
note 6, at 233. It is estimated that only 5-10% would opt in to giving consent for
further uses. REGAN, supra note 6, at 233.
'"4 Reidenberg, supra note 4, at 208. See Freiwald, supra note 11, at 961
(stating that communication attributes have been afforded weak federal
protections versus the strict protection for communication content); Prowda,
supra note 74, at 751 (stating "there is no omnibus privacy legislation applicable
to the private sector").
1"5 See Reidenberg, supra note 4, at 208.
116 See, e.g., Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986) [hereinafter ECPA] (addressing issues of
government surveillance via electronic means); Communications Act of 1934, 47
U.S.C. § 605 (1988) (controlling government wiretapping).
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information by the private sector" 7 and no underlying philosophy
that guides policymaking in this area. Notwithstanding this
historical patchwork, two new statutes have recently been proposed
that would directly regulate the use of TGI by private entities.'18
The following section analyses previous legislation and common
law decisions as they pertain to both the acquisition and dissemina-
tion of personal information, and evaluates the current proposals.
Privacy laws are based on a range of legal doctrines."9
Although the right to privacy is not expressly granted in the U.S.
Constitution, the Supreme Court has ruled in favor of various
privacy interests, deriving the right to privacy from the First, Third,
Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Amendments. 2 ° Furthermore, ten state
17 See infra Part III.C.3 (discussing the Fair Credit Reporting Act); infra
Part III.C.2. (discussing the Electronic Communications Privacy Act).
"8 The Consumer Internet Privacy Protection Act of 1997, H.R. 98, 105th
Cong., 1 st Sess. (1997); the Communications Privacy and Consumer Empower-
ment Act, H.R. 3685, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1996). See infra Part III.C-D
(discussing each act).
"9 Privacy statutes have resulted from legislation as well as common law
decisions. See Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act of 1994,
Pub. L. No. 103-414, 108 Stat. 4279 (codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010)
(1994) (restricting usage of telephone transmission information); Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (finding a privacy right in a telephone call from
a public telephone booth). See also infra note 128 and accompanying text
(discussing the federal wiretapping statute).
20 The First Amendment provides:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.
U.S. CONST. amend 1. See Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64-65 (1960)
(finding a First Amendment "right to anonymity in public expression"); NAACP
v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958) (finding a First Amendment right to
freedom of association); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957)
(enforcing a First Amendment freedom in political belief).
The Third Amendment provides:
No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without
the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be
prescribed by law.
U.S. CONST. amend III. The Third Amendment prohibition against quartering
soldiers was extended to "a right to privacy against unreasonable surveillance and
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constitutions 121 explicitly define personal privacy as a protected
and fundamental right, though no two states have the same standard."2
compulsory disclosure." REGAN, supra note 6, at 35.
The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend IV. There is an individual right as well as a protection
against arbitrary government action in the Fourth Amendment. Katz, 389 U.S.
at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (finding a Fourth Amendment right based on the
expectation of privacy); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 465-66 (1928)
(finding no privacy interest when no physical trespass was involved). But see
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 440-41 (1976) (finding no Fourth
Amendment right in personal bank records that were deemed business records of
the bank).
The Fifth Amendment provides:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury ... nor
shall any person be subject for the same offence[sic] to be twice put
in jeopardy of life or limb, nor shall be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be
taken for public use without just compensation.
U.S. CONST. amend V. A Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination
has been used to protect privacy but its application has been limited to criminal
cases. REGAN, supra note 6, at 38.
The Ninth Amendment provides:
The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights shall not be
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.
U.S. CONST. amend IX. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-86
(1965) (finding a penumbra of rights to privacy and ruling a Connecticut statute
prohibiting the prescription or use of contraceptives an infringement on marital
privacy).
21 ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 22; ARIZ. CONST. art. 2, § 8; CAL. CONST. art.
I, § 1; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23; HAW. CONST. art. I, § 6; ILL. CONST. art. I, §
6; LA. CONST. art. I, § 5; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 10; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 10;
WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7.
2' Prowda, supra note 74, at 739. See, e.g., ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 8 ("No
person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or have his home invaded, without
authority of law."); CAL. CONST. art. I, § I (listing privacy as one of the
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A. Privacy From Intrusion-Controlling Information
Acquisition
In Katz v United States,'23 Justice Harlan first articulated the
two part test for the application of the Fourth Amendment's search
and seizure provisions to privacy cases. 2 4 First, there must be a
subjective expectation of privacy and, second, that expectation must
be found reasonable from society's view.'25 Although the objec-
tive part of the test was later narrowed to allow only "legitimate"
expectations of privacy, 26 the Supreme Court has established a
continuum of locations from public spaces (such as fields and
highways) to one's home where the expectation of privacy is
unquestionably legitimate. 127
In 1968, after forty years of debate and discussion, Congress
passed Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act
("Act") 128 to codify protections and procedures for government
wiretapping. 29 This Act covered all aural acquisition of wire and
oral communication carried by commercial telephone carriers. 3 °
The Act was extended by the Electronic Communication Protection
inalienable rights).
123 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
,24 Id. at 361 (extending the expectation of privacy to telephone conversa-
tions and invalidating wiretapping without a showing of good cause by the
government). In part, this decision was based on the Supreme Court's acknowl-
edgment of the "vital role that the public telephone has come to play in private
communication." Id. at 352. But see Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 466 (holding that
there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in telephone calls and thereby
allowing wiretapping by the government).
125 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361.
126 See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978) (limiting expectation of
privacy to areas that the law recognizes as "legitimate").
127 See REGAN, supra note 6, at 37.
128 Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 213 (June 19, 1968) (codified at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2510-2520) (1968) [hereinafter Title III].
129 There were two ostensible purposes for Title III: (1) to protect the
privacy of wire and oral communications; and (2) to clarify what had been
inconsistent law by establishing uniform national rules. S. REP. No. 1097, at 66
(1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2124, 2153-54.
130 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (1968).
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Act of 1986,131 to cover the many new forms of electronic
communication that had arisen. 132
In Smith v Maryland,133 however, the Supreme Court found
no expectation of privacy attached to the numbers dialed on a
telephone because the caller assumes the risk that the telephone
company will reveal them to the police. 3 4 In dissent, Justice
Stewart argued that the numbers have content because they reveal
significant details of a person's life, and therefore should be
afforded constitutional protection. 131
The most recent successful effort to protect access to personal
information, however, was the enactment of the Driver Privacy
Protection Act of 1994.136 It was a response by Congress to the
stalking and murder of an actress whose personal information was
revealed via motor-vehicle records. 137 The law is the first legis-
lation that limits access to public records and represents a compro-
mise between individual privacy advocates and the private
sector.'38 It allows individuals to "opt out" of allowing informa-
tion to be given to marketers and others. 139 Privacy advocates,
however, sought an "opt in" approach whereby the presumption is
131 Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986) (codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 2510). See infra Part II.C.2 (discussing the Electronic Communication
Protection Act).
132 PERRITT, supra note 2, at 99. Examples of new forms of electronic
communication are: electronic mail operators, computer-to-computer data
transmission, cellular and cordless telephones, pagers, video conferencing,
communication carried by microwave or fiber optics and digitized voice or video.
The Electronic Communication Protection Act was also intended to extend
coverage beyond common carriers to private networks. PERRIrr, supra note 2,
at 99.
133 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
14 Id. at 743.
131 Id. at 746-48 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
136 18 U.S.C. § 2721 (1994).
137 BRANSCOMB, supra note 11, at 25. Rebecca Schaefer was murdered in
1989 by a stalker who obtained her address from "public" motor-vehicle records.
BRANSCOMB, supra note 11, at 25.
138 REGAN, supra note 6, at 103.
139 18 U.S.C. § 2721(b)(12)(A) ("[M]otor vehicle department has
implemented methods and procedures to ensure that-individuals are provided
an opportunity, in a clear and conspicuous manner, to prohibit such uses.. ").
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total privacy, however, an individual can give permission for his or
her name to be given out. 4 ' The information media and direct
marketing industries successfully opposed such an "opt in"
provision fearing that similar mechanisms would be required to
access other public databases such as voter registration and real
estate records.'14 In 1994, the Supreme Court stated that indi-
viduals have a "far from insignificant" privacy interest in home
address information regardless of the fact that such information
may already be in the public domain. 42
Consequently, an aggregation theory of information accumula-
tion has also been advanced against access to such information. 143
When information is gathered from sources that do not have an
expectation of privacy and is combined to give a profile of an
individual, the aggregation theory has been used to argue that the
information should be protected. 144 In Nader v General
Motors,141 Judge Breitel stated:
Although acts performed in 'public,' especially if taken
singly or in small numbers, may not be confidential, at
least arguably a right to privacy may nevertheless be
invaded through extensive and exhaustive monitoring and
cataloguing of acts normally disconnected and anon-
ymous. 14
6
This same principle is behind the 1988 Privacy Protection Act's
restrictions on combining data sets, 14' and it is certainly appli-
cable to aggregating TGI.
140 REGAN, supra note 6, at 102-03.
141 REGAN, supra note 6, at 102-03.
142 United States Dep't of Defense v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 510
U.S. 487, 501-02 (1993).
143 PERRITT, supra note 2, at 147.
144 PERRITr, supra note 2, at 147.
14' 25 N.Y.2d 560, 255 N.E.2d 765, 307 N.Y.S.2d 647 (1970).
146 Id. at 572, 255 N.E.2d at 772, 307 N.Y.S.2d at 657 (Breitel, J.,
concurring).
'47 Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(o)
(1988).
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The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit addressed the
issue of information aggregation in Tureen v Equifax, Inc..4 '
Although the court found that the defendant-credit bureau did not
violate the plaintiff's privacy "merely by collecting and retaining
his past insurance history,"'49 it left the door open in its dicta for
a cause of action for information that is "highly personal." The
court stated, "We do not rule out the possibility that instances may
exist where the collection of highly personal information, irrelevant
to any legitimate business purpose might constitute an invasion of
privacy by unreasonable intrusion."' 15
Despite these sporadic attempts to plug holes in private sector
access to citizen's personal information, commercial entities
continue to be able to obtain such information for "legitimate" uses.
Another issue, however, is to what degree the use of such informa-
tion has been regulated.
B. Privacy From Dissemination--Controlling Information
Distribution
Beginning in the 1960s and early 1970s the use of computers,
especially large capacity mainframe computers to acquire and store
information, created cause for concern about the security of
personal information. 5' Not only were Medicare, Medicaid and
other government entitlement programs expanding, but private
industry, especially the insurance and credit industries, was
increasingly using data storage to improve its operations and remain
competitive. "' With the Watergate revelations of "enemy lists"
and infiltrations of private citizens, there was a willingness
to explore possible legislation to control potential abuses.'53
148 571 F.2d 411 (8th Cir. 1978). Tureen v. Equifax, Inc. held that the release
of 25-year-old insurance information to disability fraud investigators, as part of
a credit record, was not violative of the plaintiffs privacy under either the
intrusion or private facts tort. Id. at 415-17.
149 Id. at 416.
5 Id. (footnote omitted, emphasis added).
151 REGAN, supra note 6, at 8.
152 REGAN, supra note 6, at 69.
153 See REGAN, supra note 6, at 126 (discussing the aftermath of the
656
INTERNET PRIVACY
Several policy groups and conferences were therefore established,
including the Privacy Protection Study Commission ("PPSC")154
and a 1974 Department of Health, Education and Welfare ("HEW")
committee.'55 HEW issued a report entitled "Records, Computers
and the Rights of Citizens," that pointed to inadequacies in then
current laws and policies and recommended the incorporation of the
Code of Fair Information Practices. 156 Although it was not made
Watergate revelations); Prowda, supra note 74, at 744 (explaining how such
mistrust spawned subsequent legislation).
'14 Established by Congress to make "legislative recommendations ...
necessary to protect the privacy of individuals while meeting the legitimate needs
of government and society for information." REGAN, supra note 6, at 83 (citing
the Privacy Act of 1974). See infra note 158 and accompanying text (discussing
the Privacy Act of 1974).
.55 The Secretary's Advisory Committee on Automated Personal Data
Systems was set up to "analyze and make recommendations regarding harmful
consequences that could result from computerized information systems ..
REGAN, supra note 6, at 75.
156 United States Dep't of Health Education and Welfare, Secretary's
Advisory Committee on Automated Personal Data Systems, Records, Computers,
and the Rights of Citizens (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1973)
(cited in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6916, 6923-24) [hereinafter HEW Report].
According to the recommended but unenacted Code of Fair Information Practices
set forth in the Department of Health Education and Welfare ("HEW") Report:
* There must be no personal record-keeping system
whose very existence is secret.
* There must be a way for an individual to find out
what information about him or her is in a record
and how it is used.
* There must be a way for an individual to prevent
information about him or her that was obtained for
one purpose from being used or made available for
other purposes without his or her consent.
* There must be a way for an individual to correct
or amend a record of identifiable information about
him or her.
* All organizations creating, maintaining, using, or
disseminating records of identifiable personal data
must assure the reliability of the data for their
intended use and must take precautions to prevent
misuse of the data.
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part of any subsequent bill, the Fair Information Practices Code set
a standard of information privacy that continues to be debated
today. 157
In 1975, the Privacy Act of 1974 ("Privacy Act")' 5 8  was
signed into law. It incorporated recommendations from various
governmental hearings and reports on privacy.5 9 Two key issues
in the hearings and debates prior to passage of the Privacy Act
were whether the same legislation should apply to both the public
and private sector and whether there should be a Federal Privacy
Board to oversee and administrate federal privacy protections. 160
However, due to strong pressure from federal agencies and private
industry groups, 16 1 only public actions were covered by the law
and no Federal Privacy Board was put in place.
Although the Privacy Act did not provide a governmental
oversight body nor implement the Fair Information Code, 162 it
did, however, set important standards for government information
handling. 63  It gave individuals the right to know what
157 REGAN, supra note 6, at 76-77.
' Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 (1974) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552a
(1982 & Supp. V)) [hereinafter the Privacy Act].
'59 See, e.g., HEW Report, supra note 156, at 6923-24.
160 REGAN, supra note 6, at 78.
16' For example, private industry was represented by the American Life
Insurance Association and the Department of Commerce spoke on behalf of
government agencies. These representatives argued that there was little evidence
of abuses in private sector personal information handling and put the burden of
proof on privacy advocates to come up with specific examples or actual patterns
of abuse. They also complained that the private sector was already overburdened
by regulation. REGAN, supra note 6, at 78. Additionally, they said that the private
sector would be able to "self-regulate" to protect consumers. REGAN, supra note
6, at 78.
161 See HEW Report, supra note 156, at 6923-24 (proposing the Code of Fair
Information Practices).
163 REGAN, supra note 6, at 81. Although the final version of the Privacy Act
of 1974 covered only federal agencies and did not create a separate agency to
oversee all information practices
[i]t gave individuals rights of access, correction, and knowledge about
personal records in computerized or manual files; subjected federal
agencies to standards of fair information handling; charged the Office
of Management and Budget ("OMB") with responsibility for
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information had been collected, for what purpose and to whom it
had been released. 64 Although the Privacy Act exempted the
Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI"), the Central Intelligence
Agency and other protective agencies,'65 it provided statutory
rights for citizens to begin to control their own personal
information.
Three years later, in Whalen v Roe 166 the Supreme Court, for
the first time, recognized the right to informational privacy based
on a zone of privacy that protected two kinds of interests: (1)
avoiding disclosure of personal matters; and (2) independence in
certain kinds of important decisions.'67 In upholding a New York
statute requiring computer records of prescriptions to be filed with
the state, the Supreme Court found that the filing, on its face, did
not pose a sufficiently grievous threat to either interest so as to
violate constitutional standards. 6  Thus, courts began to view
personal information as existing within a protected sphere of some
kind.
Previously, when data was part of the public record, courts used
common-law principles to prevent consumers from complaining
implementation and oversight of the act; and established the Privacy
Protection Study Commission to investigate the need for legislation
over the private sector and the need for an oversight body over federal
agencies.
REGAN, supra note 6, at 81-82.
164 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b). The Privacy Act of 1974 provided in part:
[N]o [federal] agency shall disclose any record which is contained in
a system of records by any means of communication to any person, or
to another agency, except pursuant to a written request by, or with
prior written consent of the individual to whom the record pertains.
Id
165 Id.
166 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
167 Id. at 599-600 (characterizing "important decisions" as "matters relating
to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child rearing
and education").
161 Id. at 600. The Supreme Court in Whalen v. Roe considered the security
of the database and the restrictions on the disclosure of information in its
decision. Id.
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about its distribution.'69 A recent Supreme Court case, however,
held that disclosures of information compilations may invade
privacy even when their component pieces are matters of public
record. 7 ° Therefore, based on privacy laws and these common
law decisions, the U.S. government began to be active in the area
of personal privacy. The advent of the Internet and other networked
communications mechanisms, however, has challenged the efficacy
of such a piecemeal doctrine. New legislation attempts to address
each TGI privacy issue as it arises.
C. Communications Privacy and Consumer Empowerment
Act
Representative Edward Markey (D-Mass.) has introduced the
Communications Privacy and Consumer Empowerment Act of
1996. ' This proposed bill provides for the creation of Federal
Communications Commission and Federal Trade Commission
guidelines that would ensure privacy rights in communications,
including on-line transactions. 172 As if to echo the findings of
past committees, it proposes a Privacy Protection Committee and
uses the Fair Information Code set forth in the HEW Report as the
basis of a three-pronged model of disclosure that would provide
consumers with: 1) knowledge-that personal information is being
collected; 2) notice-that the recipient of the information intends
to reuse, disclose or sell the information; and 3) a right to prohibit
any such use. 1
73
New digital technologies and other innovations allow
corporations to become more efficient workers, more
'69 Scott Shorr, Note, Personal Information Contracts: How To Protect
Privacy Without Violating the First Amendment, 80 CORNELL L. REv. 1756,
1778 (1995).
170 United States Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the
Press, 489 U.S. 749, 780 (1989).
"' H.R. 3685, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1996).
172 Id. § 3-4.
' Id. § 3(a)(1)(A)-(C). "These Core rights are embodied in a proposal I
have advocated for many years and I call it 'Knowledge, Notice and No."'
Markey Statement, supra note 1, at E 1145-01.
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productive,[sic] and businesses to conduct commerce
almost effortlessly in digital dollars. This same technology,
however, will avail corporate America of the opportunity
to track the clickstream of a citizen of the Net, to sneak
corporate hands into a personal information 'cookie jar'
and use this database to compile sophisticated, highly
personal consumer profiles of people's hobbies, buying
habits, financial information, health information, who they
contact or converse with, when and for how long. In short,
that wondrous wire may also allow digital desperadoes to
roam the electronic frontier unchecked by any high
technology sheriff or adherence to any code of electronic
ethics. '74
Although the bill is vague on whether its provisions will be
required on an opt in or opt out basis, it clearly establishes the
principles of control over one's personal information in the TGI
context.
D. Consumer Internet Privacy Protection Act
Another pertinent bill was introduced on January 7, 1997, by
Congressman Bruce Vento (D-Minn.). The Consumer Internet
Privacy Protection Act of 1997 ("CIPPA") 175 would prohibit the
disclosure of any "personally identifiable information" '76 by an
interactive computer service 177 to any third party without the
subscriber's informed written consent. CIPPA also requires such a
service, upon the subscriber's request to: 1) provide the subscriber
114 Markey Statement, supra note 1, at E 1145-01. See Larry Jaffee, Markey's
Bill To Extend Online Privacy Protection to Consumers, DIRECT MARKETING
NEWS, July 8, 1996, at 3 (for a review of the newly introduced bill); Bill
Introduced To Protect Private Information on Internet, TELECOMMUNICATIONS
& NETWORK SECURITY REv., July 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Busdtl File (analyzing Markey's bill).
'7 H.R. 98, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. (1997).
176 As defined by section 631 of the Communications Act of 1934 (47
U.S.C. § 551) (1934).
1' Defined by the Consumer Internet Privacy Protection Act as "any
information service that provides computer access to multiple users via modem
to the Internet." H.R. 98, § 4.
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with his or her personally identifiable information maintained by
the service; 2) permit the subscriber to verify and to correct such
information; and 3) provide the subscriber the identity of the third
party recipients of such information.' The bill also grants the
Federal Trade Commission investigative and enforcement author-
ity"' and provides for a private civil cause of action.' At the
time of this writing, the bill had been sent to the Subcommittee on
Telecommunications, Trade, and Consumer Protection. The
legislation is a clear warning to Internet service providers and
system administrators that even transactional information belongs
to their customers and should be handled securely.
That the Consumer Internet Privacy Protection Act was
proposed only several months after-the introduction of the Com-
munications Privacy and Consumer Empowerment Act is an
illustration of two important dynamics. On the one hand, constitu-
ents, representatives and government officials are not content to
wait for industry self-regulation when fundamental privacy
violations are at stake. There is a general mistrust of informal
industry standards and a motivation to put prophylactic protections
in place. On the other hand, these two bills are a continuation of
the historical pattern of industry-by-industry legislative response to
technological threats to privacy. Although the bills directly address
the privacy of TGI, albeit in two different contexts, they each are
another in a long line of piecemeal attempts to protect against what
is perceived as an isolated technological "threat" without articulat-
ing a more fundamental legal framework for deciding all future
issues of personal privacy.
As examples of this "sectoral-specific" approach in the past two
decades, laws in four areas, the cable/video, telecommunication,
credit bureau and marketing industries, have tried to address
privacy issues. In each case, private use of personal information has
not been regulated to any substantial degree. More significantly, no
fundamental principles of privacy have been codified in order to
lay a groundwork for future confrontations between individuals'
178 Id. § 2(c)(1).
179 Id. § 3(a).
110 Id. § 3(b)(2).
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right of personal privacy and inevitable technological encroach-
ments.
1. Cable/lideo Regulation
In the 1980s two statutes were enacted that impose limitations
directly on private parties to maintain consumer privacy in the
video rental and cable television industries. First, the Video Privacy
Protection Act of 1988 ("VPPA")' 8' was enacted in response to
the revelation, at the Supreme Court nomination hearings of Judge
Bork, that a list of his video tape rentals had been procured and
made publicly available." 2 VPPA prohibits video stores from
giving third parties information about a customer's rentals or sales.
However, mailing lists of customer addresses can be distributed
under the VPPA.183 An analogous bill, the Cable Communications
Policy Act of 1984,"84 forbids cable operators and third parties
from monitoring the viewing habits of subscribers. 85 Operators
are required to inform subscribers of what personally identifiable
information is collected and, the operators are generally barred
from disclosure to third parties without consent. 186 However, the
sale of cable operator's mailing lists is permitted when a subscriber
has been given the opportunity to limit disclosure and such
disclosure does not reveal the subscriber's viewing habits.,8 7 In
this way, video rental stores can still sell their list of addresses and
the cable industry is able to continue to exploit subscriber lists.
I' 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (1988).
182 See REGAN, supra note 6, at 199 (discussing other discrete events which
led to the enactment of specific legislation).
"' 18 U.S.C. §§ 2710-2711.
114 47 U.S.C. § 551 (1988).
85 Id. § 551(c)(2)(C)(ii)(I).
186 Id.
187 Id. See Telecommunications Privacy Notice, supra note 11, at 6844
(describing the provisions of the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984).
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2. Telecommunications
The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1984
("ECPA")'88 extended Title III protections 89 to the content of
electronic communications including e-mail, cellular telephones,
computerized transmission of data or video, and voice or display
paging devices, but not to the collection of transmission profile
data.' 90 In fact, the ECPA even specifically allowed the electronic
service provider to divulge transaction records to any government
entity without judicial intervention.' 9 ' The ECPA, because it
pertained to any communication facilities that affected interstate or
foreign commerce, did, however, eliminate the existing distinction
between commercial and private carriers.' 92 It is significant to
also note that unlike its predecessor law, Title III, the ECPA
enjoyed wide support from both private sector and government
organizations."
188 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (1986).
"9 Title Ill protects citizens against unauthorized government wiretaps. Pub.
L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 213 (June 19, 1968) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-
2520) (1968).
'90 18 U.S.C. § 2510. Under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of
1984 ("ECPA"), a provider of public telecommunications services cannot
disclose the contents of an e-mail message without the consent of at least one of
the parties. Id.; see 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3)(b). However, there is no specific
restriction against the collection of personal information gathered from
transaction data, nor is there a restriction on the duration of storage of such data.
Reidenberg & Gamet-Pol, supra note 3, at 115.
'9' The entity must present at least an administrative, grand jury or trial
subpoena. 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a).
'9' Id. § 2510(1).
'9' As Priscilla Regan points out, it took 40 years to pass Title III but only
two years to reach an agreement on the ECPA. REGAN, supra note 6, at 135.
Regan cites strong industry support as the most important reason. REGAN, supra
note 6, at 135.
Organizations that supported the final House bill representedall sectors
of the communications and information industries, including the
Electronic Mail Association, ADAPSO, the National Association of
Broadcasters, the National Cable Television Association, the Videotext
Industry Association, the Information Industry Association, the Direct
664
INTERNET PRIVACY
The Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, 194
also know as the Digital Telephony Act ("DTA"), extended the
ECPAs privacy protection to cordless telephones that lacked the
traditional expectation of privacy.' 95 DTA also addressed FBI
concerns that communication service providers were previously not
able to provide additional information to law enforcement officials
about specific calls.' 96 Therefore, DTA required "call setup
information,"' 97 or what the FBI termed "dialing information" to
be provided when subpoenaed.'98 Although official access to such
information was still limited by court monitoring, the DTA did not
change the ECPA provision permitting non-regulated disclosure of
the same information to "any non-government entity."' 99
The proposed Telephone Consumer Privacy Protection Act of
1993200 would have regulated the use of Customer Proprietary
Network Information ("CPNI") and Automatic Number Identifica-
tion ("ANI") data.2°' It sought to ban all local exchange carriers
from using CPNI: 1) to provide any service other than telephone
service; 2) to identify or solicit potential customers for services
Marketing Association, and the Associated Credit Bureaus ... [t]his
industry support is not surprising given the fact that. . . [the industry]
realized that if they could not ensure privacy and security of their
customers' communications, they would not be able to sell those
products and services.
REGAN, supra note 6, at 135.
194 Pub. L. No. 103-414, 108 Stat. 4279 (1994) (codified at 47 U.S.C.A.
§§ 1001-1010). Also known as the Digital Telephony Act.
'9' 47 U.S.C. § 1002(d).
196 Freiwald, supra note 11, at 975-76.
'9' "Call setup information is defined as information generated which
identifies the origin, destination and duration of the communication and includes
codes punched in on a touch tone telephone, modem or fax tones, and e-mail
address." Freiwald, supra note 11, at 978.
198 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (c)(1)(C) (1994).
'99 Id. § 2703(c)(1)(A).
200 Telephone Consumer Privacy Protection Act of 1993, H.R. 3432, 103d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
201 Customer Proprietary Network Information ("CPNI") and Automatic
Number Identification ("ANI") are used in gathering Caller ID information and
information about calls to "800" and "900" numbers. See Telecommunications
Privacy Notice, supra note 11, at 6845-46.
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other than telephone service; and 3) to provide customer equip-
ment.2 °2 All ANI providers were prohibited from reusing or
selling an identified number without notifying the calling party and
providing an opportunity to limit or prohibit use.20 3
3. Credit Bureaus
The Fair Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA"),0 4 the first informa-
tion privacy legislation,2 5 was amended by the Consumer Report-
ing Reform Act of 1994.2o6 The FCRA attempted to address the
concerns of the public about credit bureaus' misuse of personal
information.0 7 It required that credit reporting agencies use
"reasonable measures" to protect the confidentiality of consumer
information and ensure proper utilization of such data.208 The law
also conferred civil liability to any credit agency that is negligent
or willful in its non-compliance with the FRCA.2 °9 Successful
plaintiffs can, therefore, recover actual damages and reasonable
attorney fees for negligence, and punitive damages for willful non-
compliance.210 In practice, however, loopholes and ambiguities in
the law and First Amendment considerations have allowed credit
bureaus to use and disclose consumer information almost at
will.
2 11
202 Telephone Consumer Privacy Protection Act of 1993, H.R. 3432, 103d
Cong., 1st Sess. tit. I, § 229(a).
203 Consumer Privacy Protection Act of 1993, H.R. 3432, 103d Cong., 1st
Sess. tit. II, § 230(b)(3).
204 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (1970).
205 REGAN, supra note 6, at 101.
206 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681(T) (1994) (as amended).
207 See generally Prowda, supra note 74, at 752.
208 15 U.S.C. § 1681(b).
209 Id. § 1681(n)-(o).
210 Id
211 See Shorr, supra note 169, at 1791-93 (explaining that although the Fair
Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA") requires credit bureaus to know the uses that
third parties will make of a consumer's personal information, the act "barely
limits" its subsequent use or resale by third parties).
666
INTERNET PRIVACY
4. Direct Marketing
In response to the increase in unsolicited advertising, especially
the use of automatic dialing systems and commerce in mailing lists,
twelve states had passed laws by 1991, banning automatic dialing,
or at least limiting the hours it could be used.212 The Telemarket-
ing Protection Act of 1991213 was passed to standardize such pro-
tections and expand them to unsolicited faxes.214 Destination
Ventures, Ltd. v Federal Communication Commission215 upheld
the constitutionality of such restrictions on fax advertising.216
Although the restriction on auto dialing was held unconstitutional
in Moser v Federal Communication Commission,217 on appeal the
limitations were found to meet constitutional standards.218
212 See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17563.5 (b) (Deering 1987); GA.
CODE ANN. § 46-5-23(a) (1981); IOWA CODE § 476.57(2) (1991); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 50-670 (1991); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45:811 (West 1991); MASS.
ANN. LAWS ch. 159, § 19C (Law. Co-op. 1986); MiNN. STAT. §§ 325E.28,
325E.30 (1987); MiSS. CODE ANN. § 77-3-453 (1989); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §
399-p(2) (McKinney 1988); OR. REV. STAT. § 759.290 (1989); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 47-18-1502 (1990); WASH. REV. CODE § 80.36.400 (1986).
"No person may use an automatic dialing and announcing device for
purposes of commercial solicitation. This section applies to all commercial
solicitation intended to be received by telephone customers within the state."
WASH. REV. CODE § 80.36.400(2). At least five states have passed laws since
1991 regulating such calls. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 367.461 (Michie
1992); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 86-1212 (1993); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-30
(1993); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2917.21 (1996); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2511
(1992).
213 47 U.S.C. § 227 (1991)
214 Id. § 227b(1)(C).
21 46 F.3d 54 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that the ban on unsolicited fax
advertising did not violate advertiser's First Amendment rights because the ban
reasonably fit the government's interest in preventing shifting of advertising costs
to consumers-in the form of paper, ink and telephone line time-and the ban
was evenhanded as it applied to any organization).
216 Id. at 56.
217 826 F. Supp. 360, 367 (D. Or. 1993), rev'd, 46 F.3d 970 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 2615 (1995).
218 Moser v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 46 F.3d 970, 975 (9th Cir.
1994) (concluding that automated telemarketing calls are a threat to privacy that
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IV PRIVACY DOCTRINES
Although the underlying principles of both the Markey bill219
and the Vento bill22° are based on the Fair Information Code,22'
the enacted statutes cited in the preceding section have been largely
reactive to privacy concerns and without any overarching privacy
doctrine or the guidelines of an official privacy oversight body. As
technology continues to present novel methods of intrusion into
personal lives, privacy advocates seek legal grounding to support
pro-active regulation against TGI dissemination. This Note provides
analysis of two areas of law which may ultimately provide this
basis-tort and property law.
A. Privacy Violation as Tort
Following the publication of Warren and Brandeis's influential
article in 1890,222 common law privacy developed independently
in each state. In 1960, Dean Prosser identified four common law
privacy torts223 that were later adopted by the Restatement
(Second) of Torts,224 including: 1) publicity which unreasonably
places the other in a false light before the public; 2) unreasonable
intrusion upon seclusion of another; 3) unreasonable publicity given
to the other's private life; and 4) misappropriation of the other's
name or likeness.225
To establish a cause of action under the first category of false
light publicity, the claimant must establish both that a falsity was
communicated and that it became "public knowledge" in its
can be regulated, though not curtailed entirely, under the statute without violating
the First Amendment), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2615 (1995).
2'9 H.R. 3685, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1996).
220 H.R. 98, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. (1997).
221 See HEW Report, supra note 156, at 6923-24.
222 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV.
L. REV. 193 (1890).
223 William Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960).
224 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652 (1977).
225 Id.
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communication to the public.22 6 The second prong of this
test-the communication of the information-appears applicable in
the TGI context because personal data is compiled and dis-
seminated to the public in a marketing database. However, the first
prong-the veracity of personal transactional information-is not
at issue because the data is recorded electronically and not subject
to human error or falsification. Therefore, the tort of false light
publicity would not generally be the basis for a viable TGI action.
The second tort, intrusion of seclusion, will also be problematic
to apply in the TGI context. Intrusion of seclusion sets out three
components that must be met to recover damages. The intrusion
must be highly offensive to a reasonable person,227 must be
intentional22 and must occur in a place where the plaintiff has a
reasonable expectation of privacy.229 It is difficult to say if this
doctrine is applicable to TGI. Is the use of such information
"highly offensive" or "outrageous" 230 rather than "merely
offensive, insensitive, or intrusive? '231 Cases have generally held
that neither the solicitation nor the provision of information that is
generally available "through normal avenues of investigation,
inquiry or observation" are per se not highly offensive. 2
226 DAVID A. ELDER, THE LAW OF PRIVACY §§ 4:2-:4, at 274-99 (1991).
227 RESTATEMENT supra note 224, § 652B.
228 RESTATEMENT supra note 224, § 652B & cmt. a.
229 RESTATEMENT supra note 224, § 652B & cmt. b.
230 RESTATEMENT supra note 224, § 652B & cmt. d.
231 See, e.g., Seaphus v. Lilly, 691 F. Supp. 127, 132 (N.D. Ill. 1988)
(obtaining unlisted phone number found not to be tortious); N.O.C., Inc. v.
Schaefer, 484 A.2d 729, 733 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1984) (finding mild surveillance
of suspected illegal dumping not tortious); Chicarella v. Passant, 494 A.2d 1109,
1114 (Pa. Super. 1985) (ruling solicitation by deception or disclosure of
confidential medical information that is not particularly embarrassing not
sufficiently offensive).
232 ELDER, supra note 226, § 2: 1, at 21 (1991 & Supp. Mar. 1996). See, e.g.,
Wolf v. Regardie, 553 A.2d 1213, 1218, (D.C. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that
garnering information from third parties and public records about plaintiffs
business deals are matters of public record or "knowledge readily available to
anyone who would wish to obtain it" and therefore does not constitute intrusion);
Dwyer v. American Express Co., 652 N.E.2d 1351, 1354-55 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995)
(rejecting intrusion claim for defendant's renting of information regarding credit
cardmember's spending propensities used by recipients for targeted marketing).
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Although the "taking" of transactional information clearly seems
intentional, one defense to this element could be that the informa-
tion was not obtained by an actual intrusion, but was gathered
passively.233 Furthermore, it is doubtful that Internet use carries a
reasonable expectation of privacy, and this element would,
therefore, not be met. Finally, who is doing the "intruding" will
impact on the weighing of factors. For example, an Internet service
provider might be able to use personal information under the theory
of an implied privilege.3 4
The third privacy tort, that of public disclosure of private facts,
also fails to provide a sure remedy against TGI use. Most transac-
tional information disclosures do not satisfy the three elements
necessary to fall within this doctrine. These elements are that the
disclosure must be found "highly offensive," '235 the plaintiff must
be "reasonably identifiable from the matter disclosed" '236 and the
information must reach so many people that it becomes "public
knowledge." '237 As in the intrusion tort, whether use of TGI meets
the highly offensive standard is questionable. Although a "reason-
able" identification can be made of a user from his or her TGI it
is not a particular plaintiff but rather a particular computer that is
being identified.238 Again, the public knowledge requirement will
easily be met when TGI is distributed for use on-line. Hence, the
net result here is that the tort of disclosure of private facts will also
have trouble providing protection from unauthorized use of TGI.
233 See Pearson v. Dodd, 410 F.2d 701, 705 (D.C. Cir.) (holding that the
news media's passive receipt of information regarding a senator was not
tortious), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 947 (1969).
234 How courts have treated credit bureaus' use of private information is
illustrative of how they might view intrusions into TGI. Credit bureaus have
established a qualified privilege to disseminate credit reports. Shorr, supra note
169, at 1778. This has rested on the grounds that such information is an "integral
part of the business community," is available via "normal avenues of investiga-
tion, inquiry or observation" and that consent for such activities is implicitly
given to the credit card company, stores that honor the card and credit bureaus
themselves when the credit application is signed. Shorr, supra note 169, at 1778.
235 RESTATEMENT, supra note 224, § 652D.
236 ELDER, supra note 226, § 3:3B, at 162.
237 RESTATEMENT, supra note 224, § 652D cmt. a.
238 See CDT Privacy Page, supra note 30.
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However, there is one tort, the fourth tort, that seems to
specifically address the harm of TGI: misappropriation. Although
applied more often to well-known personalities,239 the tort of
misappropriation implies a deprivation of dignity and economic loss
to any person. 240 It is the non-consensual use of one's name or
likeness for the economic or other benefit of the appropriator.24'
Furthermore, to meet this standard it must be shown that the
plaintiff's name or likeness was appropriated for the defendant's
advantage.242 Because TGI can be seen as a "personality profile"
analogous to a person's image,243 and, in marketing contexts, it
is clearly of economic advantage, it would appear that the non-
consensual use of on-line transaction information satisfies these
factors, 244 and would produce a sustainable argument for mis-
appropriation.
In sum, the original four privacy torts provide tenuous protec-
tion against the use of TGI. One author has argued for a new
tort-tortious commercial dissemination of private facts-which is
based on an "undifferentiated interest in human dignity" and
protects the same values protected by the four Prosser torts.245
239 See Onassis v. Christian Dior-N.Y., Inc., 122 Misc. 2d 603, 472 N.Y.S.2d
254 (Sup. Ct. 1984), aff'd, 110 A.D.2d 1095, 448 N.Y.S.2d 943 (lst Dep't 1985)
(mem.).
240 ELDER, supra note 226, § 6:1, at 379.
241 ELDER, supra note 226, § 6:2, at 380.
242 ELDER, supra note 226, § 6:2, at 380.
243 Jonathan P. Graham, Note, Privacy, Computers, and the Commercial
Dissemination of Personal Information, 65 TEX. L. REV. 1395, 1413 (1987).
244 It should be noted that courts have been reluctant to impose penalties on
defendants who sell consumer lists for advertising purposes. See Shibley v. Time,
Inc., 341 N.E.2d 337, 340 (Ohio Ct. App. 1975) (selling of subscription lists to
direct marketers did not constitute an invasion of privacy); Joel E. Smith,
Annotation, Invasion of Privacy by Sale or Rental of List of Customers,
Subscribers, or the Like to One Who Will Use It for Advertising Purposes, 82
A.L.R.3d 772 (1978).
245 Graham, supra note 243, at 1419, 1428. Graham's "tortious commercial
dissemination of private facts" recognizes the uses that can be made of personal
information in electronic communication. Graham, supra note 243, at 1412.
"Clearly the traditional definitions of what constitutes a privacy tort do not
encompass the problem of information privacy because the cases that led to their
developmentwere decided before new information techniques became prevalent."
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Despite the hurdles to creating a new cause of action, as well as the
apparent reluctance of courts to restrict commercial activities,
246
the new tort of tortious commercial dissemination of private facts
is one viable foundation for the expansion of privacy protection in
the digital age. In the alternative, this Note argues for at least the
application of the misappropriation tort when personal information
is used without consent and to the detriment of the consumer.
B. Privacy as Property Right
Another traditional area of law that might successfully be
applied to the unauthorized dissemination of personal information
and TGI is property law.247 In reality, property law was one of
the doctrines underlying Warren and Brandeis's establishment of a
Graham, supra note 243, at 1418. Graham sets out several levels of conduct that
could be encompassed by this new cause of action. First, he questions at what
level information gathering should be controlled, and decides that it should be
controlled at the point dissemination is attempted. Next, he concedes that not all
information collection is harmful but would allow the common law to draw
distinctions between notorious and benign uses. Finally, the restrictions must pass
constitutional muster in the face of First Amendment arguments. Graham
proposes a judicial balancing of interests similar to the test used in New York
Times v. Sullivan, 3 76 U.S. 254 (1964). He further argues that correctly weighing
the interests of commercial non-press speech would enable such a remedy to
meet First Amendment standards and be held constitutional. See Graham, supra
note 243, at 1428-38.
246 See supra note 244 (discussing cases in which commercial uses of
information have been allowed).
247 See generally Arthur R. Miller, Personal Privacy in the Computer Age:
The Challenge of New Technology in an Information-OrientedSociety, 67 MICH.
L. REV. 1091, 1223-26 (1969) (discussing the granting of a property right in
personal information).
Perhaps the most facile approach to safeguarding privacy is the
suggestion that control over personal information be considered a
property right, vested in the subject of the data and eligible for the full
range of constitutional and legal protections that attach to property.
Id. at 1223-25. See ALAN WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDoM 324-25 (1967)
(calling for defining the right of decision over "private personalty" as a property
right with all the attendant due process guarantees and regulation).
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privacy tort.248 They drew on common law copyright principles
to support the premise that there is a property right in "personal
interest" such as the right to be let alone. 49 In particular, intel-
lectual property interests in trade secret protection and the right of
publicity seem applicable to the sale of TGI personal information
to direct marketers.
A trade secret has value because it is private and therefore
restrictions can be placed on a third party's use. Trade secrets
represent "the right to retain exclusive control or knowledge of
certain information., 250 In addition, trade secrets must meet the
following criteria to be protected in court:
(1) few outside the claimant's business know the
information;
(2) the claimant has limited disclosure of the
information within his business;
(3) the claimant has taken reasonable precautions
to ensure the secrecy of the information;
(4) the information is valuable to the claimant
and gives him a competitive business advan-
tage;
(5) the claimant had developed or acquired the
information at some expense; and
(6) the information is difficult to acquire from
other sources.25'
It is arguable that if an individual's use of his or her computer to
obtain information from networks is considered his or her
248 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 222, at 200.
249 Diane L. Zimmerman, Information as Speech, Information as Goods:
Some Thoughts on Marketplaces and the Bill of Rights, 33 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 665, 699 (1992). Interestingly, the tort was predicated on the general
principle of an "inviolate personality" that also underlies copyright and other
intellectual property rights. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 222, at 205-06.
250 RAYMOND T. NIMMER, THE LAW OF COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY 16.02 (2d
ed. 1992).
25! RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939). See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 40 (1995) (discussing the modernized
standard on trade secrets).
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"business," then TGI personal information substantially meets these
criteria and could be protected as a trade secret.
It is also possible that the privacy of our TGI personal
information is a property right much like the right of publicity
granted to celebrities. Under this common law doctrine, a plaintiff,
usually a famous individual, has a cause of action to recover
damages for any economic harm to the value of the plaintiff's
identity.2 A defendant's liability is based on the use of the
celebrity's name or physical likeness for the defendant's own
pecuniary benefit without the individual's consent." 3 It is now
well established that this right extends to non-celebrities as
well.2 4 "If one's identity has commercial value, one should have
a right to control and benefit from its commercial uses, regardless
of whether one is a celebrity. 2 55 As with all property, the right
of publicity can be assigned and licensed. 6 In the TGI context,
the recognition of a right of publicity in one's personal information
confers property status on this information that can then be
protected and exploited by the computer user.257
252 THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 3.1 [B],
at 3-3 (1994). A right of privacy plaintiff must prove: (1) ownership of an
enforceable right in his or her identity; (2) that the defendant (a) used some
aspect of the plaintiffs identity or persona, (b) without the plaintiffs consent
and (c) in a manner that rendered the plaintiff identifiable; and (3) that the
defendant's use is likely to damage the commercial value of the plaintiffs
identity. Id.
253 Id.
254 See Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821, 824
n. 11 (9th Cir. 1974). See also Tellado v. Time-Life Books, 643 F. Supp. 904,
913 (D.N.J. 1986) (finding a right for a non-celebrity to be compensated for the
use of his or her likeness); Onassis v. Christian Dior-N.Y., Inc., 122 Misc. 2d
603, 610, 472 N.Y.S.2d 254, 260 (Sup. Ct. 1984) (reviewing interpretation of
state privacy statute and concluding that "all persons, of whatever station in life,
from the relatively unknown to the world famous, are to be secured against
rapacious commercial exploitation"). See generally ELDER, supra note 226, § 6.1,
at 379; MCCARTHY, supra note 252, § 4.3.
25 Shorr, supra note 169, at 1827.
256 ELDER, supra note 226, § 6.1, at 377 n.8; MCCARTHY, supra note 252,
§ 10.3[B][1].
257 Under this argument, because all individuals have the power to
hypothecate their property, personal data can be exploited via contract or license.
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Trade secrets and the right of publicity are two areas of
property law that could be reasonably applied to control unauthor-
ized uses of personal information taken from the Internet and other
communication networks. When combined with the legitimization
of tortious claims for the same harms, a basis for privacy protection
is established that is far sturdier than the fencing erected over the
past thirty years by the individual laws discussed above.
Based on deeply rooted principles in common law and property
rights, such a conceptualization avoids the familiar political struggle
to set a negotiated standard for privacy rights. The property and
tort approaches acknowledge the fundamental nature of personal
privacy. They institute the same kind of protections and account-
abilities proposed by privacy advocates when they unsuccessfully
fought for a privacy bureau and a code of privacy principles.
Although the two proposed bills attempt to put in place the same
ideas, they are once again a reaction to specific threats in circum-
scribed industries. The larger doctrinal change, on the other hand,
establishes a bulwark likely to withstand the ravages of technology
leaps and policy swings and therefore maintain personal autonomy
over our individual TGI-a powerful and valuable new commodity.
CONCLUSION
The commercial use of transaction generated personal informa-
tion in networked computer environments represents the latest and
most significant challenge to personal privacy in the United States.
In the past, new technologies also posed dangers to personal
privacy and were addressed in turn, culminating in sector-specific
regulation. Whenever technology has enabled commercial interests
"If there is value in it, sufficient to excite the cupidity of another, why is it not
the property of him who gives it the value and from whom the value springs?"
ELDER, supra note 226, § 6:1, at 376 (quoting Munden v. Harris, 134 S.W. 1076
(Mo. 1911)). "[A] federal statute focused on the proprietary origins of privacy
could improve substantially upon current law by recognizing property rights in
personal information and enabling personal information contracts to govern major
informational transactions." Shorr, supra note 169, at 1818. Without a federal
statute, common law will not be able to provide standardized nationwide
protection. Shorr, supra note 169, at 1818 n.301.
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to intrude upon individual privacy, legislation has been promulgated
to prevent abuses in each industry. Despite the protections of the
First Amendment and the promise of self-regulation, industry has
been statutorily bridled against its natural competitive and commer-
cial tendencies to use information to the particular industry's best
advantage. In each instance, similar issues were presented: lack of
personal control, information gathered for one purpose used for
another, surplus information stored and errors not addressed and
inter-organization usage. Strong cases were made for consumer
control of personal information, enforcement agency oversight and
guidelines for commercial uses. However, the strength of the
commercial lobby succeeded in restricting the scope of each
problem to its unique issues, thereby creating only narrow legis-
lation.258
It is, therefore, evident that official statutory protection is
essential to control intrusions into computer TGI privacy. The
proposed Communications Privacy and Consumer Empowerment
Act of 1996259 and the proposed Consumer Internet Privacy
Protection Act of 1997260 offer such protections and should be
passed as soon as possible.
Furthermore, the power and interconnectivity of the digital
network and its growing ubiquity in our society present a challenge
wholly different from past threats to privacy. The unprecedented
nature of this challenge calls for new legislation and something
more: a substantive expansion of legal privacy protection doctrine
to include tort and property rights in order to guard against the
non-consensual use of TGI. These two legal theories may also
provide a broadened legal basis to protect individuals' privacy from
technologies not yet developed.
21' For examples of narrowly drawn legislation see the Fair Credit Reporting
Act, the Cable Communications Policy Act, the Video Privacy Protection Act
and the Telemarketing Protections Act. See supra Part III.C.1-4 (discussing
existing legislation).
259 Communications Privacy and Consumer Empowerment Act of 1996, H.R.
3685, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1996).
260 Consumer Internet Privacy Protection Act, H.R. 98, 105th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1997).
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Although the issues in each past technological challenge are
similar to the TGI issues we now face-intrusion into private
activities-the enormity of the qualitative and quantitative intrusion
puts TGI into a different category altogether. At the dawn of a new
"networked" age that will link individuals into a "global
community," there is a tremendous risk of losing control over
easily obtained, personal and essential information-information
that contributes to our "inviolate personality.,261 In the future of
networked communication, not only will networks extend into
communities and create links to providers of shopping, education,
social and financial services, but networks will extend "inward" and
links with domestic "personal services" will be ubiquitous.2 61 If
strong personal privacy protections are not put in place today,
access to TGI from such internal networks will allow commercial
entities access to much more than mere mailing lists.
261 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 222, at 205-06.
262 Tiny processors may link your "command center" (on your watch or
personal communicator, perhaps) with information monitoring and control
capabilities for appliances, computers, vehicle maintenance, home temperature
and security control. David Kline, The Embedded Internet, WIRED, Oct. 1996,
at 98.
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